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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
¶1 The community of nations condemns the practice of sentencing children to 
life without parole as a human rights violation. Its condemnation is expressed through 
treaties and customary international laws.1 Short of the death penalty, life without parole 
(LWOP) is the harshest sentence a person can receive in the United States.2 In December 
2006, the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the abolition of LWOP for 
children and young teenagers. The vote was 185 to 1, with the United States as the sole 
dissenter.3 Currently, the United States is the only country that sentences child4 offenders 
to spend the rest of their natural lives in prison.5 In 2005, 2,484 children were serving life 
without parole sentences in the United States.6 
¶2 Very few countries have used LWOP to punish juvenile offenders. In fact, 
135 countries have expressly rejected the sentence through their domestic laws, and 185 
have done so in the UN General Assembly. Israel, Tanzania, and South Africa, countries 
that previously sentenced children to LWOP, have amended their laws to allow parole for 
juveniles in all cases.7 Although General Assembly statements are not binding, and ten 
countries have laws that could theoretically allow children to receive a LWOP sentence, 
there are no known cases of these countries actually using the sentence.8 The United 
States is the only known violator of international human rights standards prohibiting 
LWOP sentences for children.9  
                                                 
* Northwestern University School of Law JD/PhD student. Special thanks to Simmie Baer and other 
professors at Northwestern University’s Juvenile Justice Clinic for their support and inspiration. 
1 Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 
983, 986 (2008).  
2 Id. at 983. 
3 See generally Adam Liptak, Lifers as Teenagers, Now Seeking Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2007, at A1.  
4 This note uses the definition of “child” found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 1: “A 
child means every human being below the age of eighteen years.” United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].  
5 Liptak, supra note 3; De la Vega et. al., supra note 1, at 989; Hilary Massey, Case Comment, Disposing 
of Children: The Eight Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 
1085 (2006). 
6 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (2005) [hereinafter Amnesty & HRW]; De la Vega et. 
al., supra note 1, at 985. 
7 De la Vega et. al., supra note 1, at 986. 
8 Id. at 990 & n.20. These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brunei, Cuba, 
Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands, and Sri Lanka.  
9 Id. at 985-86, 990. 
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¶3 How is it that the country that holds itself out as a beacon of light to the rest 
of the world, a country that portrays itself as a champion of human rights, treats its most 
vulnerable citizens in a way that most of the world frowns upon? Public fears about the 
rise of young ‘super-predators’10 during the 1990s fueled legislation aimed at 
incapacitating and incarcerating the most dangerous subset of youth in the United 
States.11 Few, if any, children who receive LWOP sentences fit the profile of a super-
predator, however. An estimated 59% of children received a LWOP sentence for their 
first criminal conviction.12 Although 93% of these children received the sentence because 
they were convicted of homicide, 26% were convicted of felony murder.13 The United 
States’ practice of sentencing children to life in prison without parole is not only a 
misguided violation of the standards of decency of U.S. laws, but is also a violation of 
international human rights law.  
¶4 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to prohibit the practice of sentencing 
children to LWOP when it heard the cases of Sullivan v. Florida and Graham v. 
Florida.14 The Court ruled that LWOP is only unconstitutional in cases where children 
committed non-homicide offenses.15 This paper argues that the Supreme Court wrongly 
decided Sullivan and Graham because juvenile LWOP violates both domestic and 
international human rights law. Under the Eighth Amendment as well as precedent 
including Roper v. Simmons, LWOP for juveniles is unconstitutional. Also, the Supreme 
Court should have turned to international human rights law as a basis for deciding that 
LWOP sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional.16 If the Court had used customary 
international law and international treaties like the Convention of the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Convention Against Torture), and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) to evaluate juvenile LWOP, it would have reached the decision 
that LWOP sentences for all children are unconstitutional.  
                                                 
10 See generally John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 
1995, at 23 (In 1995, Princeton University Professor John DiIulio coined the term ‘super-predator’ to warn 
the United States that a wave of dangerously vicious and violent youth, who mugged, raped, and murdered 
without remorse would descend upon them by the year 2010). 
11 AMNESTY & HRW, supra note 6, at 35-38. 
12 Id. at 1. 
13 Id. at 27 (The felony murder rule is a form of strict liability in the criminal context. It criminalizes the 
acts that result in death of during the commission of a felony crime. There is no independent mens rea 
requirement.  The 26% figure is based on a self-reported, non-random sample.); See also Erin H. Flynn, 
Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and Retribution Post-Roper v. 
Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2008). 
14 Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
15 Id. 
16 Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted “[T]he 
United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty” Id. at 
577). The Supreme Court’s decision to incorporate international standards when it abolished the death 
penalty in Roper was not without controversy. Justice Scalia argued, “though the view of our own citizens 
are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called 
international community take center stage.” Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Legal scholars also decried 
the Court’s reference to international standards; See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. 
Constitution, 131 POL’Y REV. 33, 47-49 (2005);  Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The 
Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the "Opinions 
of Mankind", 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261, 265 (2005). 
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¶5 Part I of this note provides the legal and historical backdrop of sentencing 
children to life without parole. Part II details the factual backgrounds of Sullivan and 
Graham and reviews the Supreme Court’s resolution of these cases. The specific ways in 
which juvenile LWOP sentences violate international human rights law are detailed in 
Part III. Part IV will conclude the note with the argument that the United States will 
continue to violate international human rights law because the Supreme Court did not 
categorically ban LWOP in Graham. 
II. A SOCIO-LEGAL HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE EMERGENCE OF LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 
A. Early Juvenile Courts and the Rehabilitative Ideal 
¶6 The conceptualization of childhood in the United States underwent a 
dramatic shift at the end of the nineteenth century, as children were no longer considered 
adults with miniature bodies.17 Progressive Era reformers like Julia Lathrop, Jane Adams, 
and Sophonsiba Breckinridge emphasized children’s innocence, malleability, and 
vulnerability,18 and viewed deviant behavior as part of the development process.19 They 
believed that children who committed crimes could be rehabilitated and emphasized a 
rehabilitative ideal that condemned the practice of trying children in adult criminal courts 
and placing them in adult prisons.20 As a result of their advocacy, juvenile courts were 
established throughout the country and children’s cases began to be diverted away from 
adult criminal courts.21 Juvenile courts’ jurisdiction began to be extended to both 
delinquent and dependent children, thus buttressing their image as benign, non-punitive, 
therapeutic institutions.22 
¶7 Until the 1960s, juvenile courts lacked standardized criminal procedures, and 
their operation was characterized by a lack of legal representation for accused children, 
indiscriminate sentencing, and wide judicial discretion over what factors would be 
considered in a hearing.23 This resulted in arbitrary and unfair treatment of children put 
before the courts.24  A due process revolution in juvenile courts occurred as a result of the 
                                                 
17 DAVID S. TANENHAUS, Degrees of Discretion: The First Juvenile Court and the Problem of Difference in 
the Early Twentieth Century, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 105 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 
2005) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion]. 
18 Id. at 107; DAVID S. TANENHAUS, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: 
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, (Margaret K. 
Rosenheim, et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, The Evolution].  
19 LEE TEITELBAUM, Status Offenses and Status Offenders, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 158, 162 
(Margaret K. Rosenheim, et al. eds., 2002). 
20 Tanenhaus, Degrees of Discretion, supra note 17, at 107; Tanenhaus, The Evolution, supra note 18, at 
42. 
21 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 63 (1999); 
Tanenhaus, The Evolution, supra note 18, at 42-44.  
22 Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 17 (Delinquent children are children who have broken the law while dependent 
children include those who are wards of the state because they have been abandoned, neglected, or abused 
in their homes). 
23 Id. at 17-18. 
24 Id. at 18. 
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Civil Rights Movement and the Warren Court.25 The Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights led to rules that 
limited judicial discretion and instituted new procedures.26 In Kent v. United States, 
decided in 1966, the Court required procedural due process waivers to safeguard against 
judicial waiver of proceedings.27 The following year, In re Gault mandated that states 
provide children accused of crimes advance notice of charges, the right to counsel and to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, a fair and impartial hearing, and the right to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment.28  
¶8 These Supreme Court decisions coincided with urban race riots and an 
increase in youth crime rates.29 Conservative politicians capitalized on the backlash 
against the Civil Rights Movement by utilizing white voters’ apprehensions about new 
race relations and crime to promote ‘tough on crime’ policies.30 Discussions about crime 
became racially politicized, and the procedural changes in the juvenile justice system 
were maligned.31  
B. Adult Time for Adult Crimes: The Abandonment of the Rehabilitative Ideal and 
the Politics of Race 
¶9 Public support for the rehabilitative ideal in juvenile courts had significantly 
declined by the early seventies. By calling for law and order, announcing a War on 
Drugs, and advocating a crackdown on crime, politicians and the media developed a 
coded language by which they could discuss legitimate criminal policy issues while 
activating racial stereotypes and playing on society’s racial fears without even 
mentioning race.32 Conservative politicians blamed the perceived breakdown in law and 
order on the Warren Court’s decisions and characterized the new due process protections 
as coddling criminals.33 The media shaped public perception by encouraging the belief 
that urban black males were responsible for committing all of the violent crimes.34  The 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 21. 
27 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also Barry C. Feld, Race and the Jurisprudence of 
Juvenile Justice: A Tale in Two Parts 1950-2000, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 122, 130 (Darnell F. Hawkins & 
Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005). 
28 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New 
Juvenile Court, in READINGS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 365 (Barry C. Feld ed., 1999). 
29 Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 18-19. 
30 THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES 
ON AMERICAN POLITICS 74-77 (W. W. Norton & Company 1991); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS 
HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY 107-110 (University of 
Chicago Press 1999); Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 25-27. 
31 EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 30, at 49-52, 111-112;  Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 
27, 33. 
32 EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 30, at 69-73; TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN 
STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 90-98 (Princeton University Press. 2001); 
Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 27, 33. 
33 KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 
30-43 (Oxford University Press 1997); Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 32. 
34 AMNESTY & HRW, supra note 6, at 25-26; SARA SUN BEALE, News Media's Influence on Criminal 
Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 441-461 
(2006); Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 31. 
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“get tough” policies that gained momentum in the seventies included both the resumption 
of capital punishment and the adoption of life without parole sentences for children.35 
¶10 This turn towards focusing on retribution as opposed to rehabilitation for 
juvenile offenders began with the highly publicized case of Willie Bosket.36 In 1978, 
Bosket, a young African American male, was fifteen years old when he was convicted of 
shooting and killing two people in a New York subway. He was sentenced to five years 
in a youth facility, the maximum sentence for the crime under New York juvenile law.37 
As a result of cries for “get tough” measures for juveniles, the New York legislature 
instituted tougher penalties for children and passed laws allowing children to be tried as 
adults outside of the juvenile court system.38 Similar laws were promulgated around the 
country and the rehabilitative ideal was replaced with a spirit of vengeance.39 Before 
1980, life without parole sentences were rarely imposed on children, but by 1989 the 
number of child offenders who received LWOP had increased markedly.40 
¶11 Conservative politicians together with the media reinforced the perceived 
relationship between race and crime throughout the seventies and eighties by employing 
language that conjured up images of animals and disease. Children in the inner-city were 
characterized as “wolf packs,” “wilding packs,” “vermin,” and “wild dogs” who went 
“prowling” among “decent citizens.”41 Politicians and academics like Richard Nixon and 
John DiIulio warned of the coming of a generation of young “super-predators” who 
would usher in an “epidemic of violence.”42 The media coverage surrounding the 
infamous 1989 Central Park jogger case, where five black and Latino boys were accused 
of assaulting and raping a white, female investment banker, epitomized this trend. The 
crime sent shockwaves across the country and was publicized through every major media 
outlet. Newspapers headlines featured titles like “Wolf-Pack’s Prey” and “Heroic Woman 
vs. Feral Beast.”43 It was within this politically charged climate of fear, that the petitioner 
in Sullivan, a young African American male, was accused of raping an older white 
                                                 
35 Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to 
Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 55 (2008) [Hereinafter Feld, A Slower 
Form of Death]; Edsall & Edsall, supra note 29, at 74-77; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, 31-39 
(1976); See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207-09 (1976) (where the death penalty was reinstated 
after the Court’s earlier decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (where the Court invalidated 
state death penalty statutes)). 
36 Cynthia L. Schirmer, Punishing Children as Adults: On Meeting International Standards and U.S. 
Ratification of the U.N. Conventinon on the Rights of the Child, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 715, 728 (2008). 
37 Id. at 728; Richard J. Meislen, Carey, in Shift, Backs Trial in Adult Court for Some Juveniles, N.Y. 
Times, June 30, 1978, at A1. 
38 Schirmer, supra note 36, at 728; Marcia Chambers, Family Court Assailed as Overprotective on Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 1982, at A1; Elsa Brenner, Strengthening ‘Rules of Society’ for Violent Youths, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 1997, at WC1. 
39 Schirmer, supra note 36, at 728; Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the 
Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 383 (1998). 
40 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 29-31; Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 31.  
41 Dwight Conquergood, The Power of Symbols, (One City: The Chicago Council on Urban Affairs, 1996); 
Lynell Hancock, Wolf Pack? The Press and the Central Park Jogger, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 
2003, at 38.  
42 Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 31; Beckett, supra note 33, at 38; John DiIulio, How to 
Stop the Coming Crime Wave 23–28 (New York Manhattan Institute 1996). 
43 Hancock, supra note 41, at 38. The four boys were tried and convicted of the crime even though no 
biological evidence linked them to the crime. Thirteen years later, a man whose DNA matched the 
biological evidence retrieved by the police confessed to the crime. Id. at 39-40. 
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woman.44 By 1989, it was widely understood that the “get tough” and “law and order” 
campaigns were largely targeted at young black males.45  
¶12 By the mid-nineties, nearly every state had adopted punitive laws that 
allowed prosecutors to transfer more child offenders to adult criminal courts. A few states 
even lowered the age of juvenile jurisdiction from eighteen to seventeen years of age so 
that more children could automatically be placed in the adult system.46 This climate of 
public hysteria and racial propaganda caused the number of children sentenced to life 
without parole to skyrocket. The rate of LWOP sentences for children peaked in 1996.47  
III. SUPREME COURT ROAD: SULLIVAN V. FLORIDA AND GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
A. Sullivan v. Florida 
1. Factual Background and Procedural History 
¶13 In 1989, the same year the hysteria over the Central Park Jogger case erupted, 
Joe Sullivan, a thirteen-year-old mentally disabled African American boy, was accused of 
raping an older white woman in Florida.48 He became the youngest person in the country 
to be sentenced to life without parole.49 Sullivan’s race was repeatedly stressed at his 
trial.50 The victim, who never saw her attacker’s face, testified that her assailant was “a 
colored boy” with “kinky hair...he was quite black, and he was small.”51 Sullivan’s 
attorney, who waived opening statement, was alleged to have provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel.52 The trial concluded after eight hours, and the jury only took 
thirty-five minutes to convict Sullivan.53 Despite a lack of biological or physical evidence 
linking Sullivan to the crime, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.54 
¶14 Sullivan became involved in the case when two older teens, fifteen-year-old 
Michael Gulley and seventeen-year-old Nathan McCants, convinced him to break into a 
home with them.55 McCants stole some coins and jewelry, and then all three boys left the 
                                                 
44 Liliana Segura, Ugly Truth: Most U.S. Kids Sentenced to Die In Prison Are Black, Global Research, 
Nov. 11, 2009. 
45 Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 34; Gilens, supra note 29, at 602. 
46 Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, supra note 22, at 34; JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 223 (Joan 
McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom & Nancy A. Crowell eds., 2001). 
47 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 2; See also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, EASY ACCESS TO THE FBI'S SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS: 1980-2000, 
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/methods.asp. 
48 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (S. Ct. filed Dec. 4, 2008) at 5 
[hereinafter Sullivan, Petition for Cert]; Segura, supra note 44; Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 31. 
49 Segura, supra note 44. 
50 Amy Bach, All Locked Up: Did Joe Sullivan, Sentenced to Life at 13, Have a Fair Trial?, SLATE, Nov. 4, 
2009 at 2; Segura, supra note 44.  
51 Segura, supra note 43; Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 47, at 5. 
52 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 21, 24; Bach, supra note 49. 
53 Brief of Respondent, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (S. Ct) at 21 [hereinafter, Brief of Respondent, 
Sullivan]; Bach, supra note 50. 
54 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 47, at 5. The State of Florida had destroyed all biological evidence 
collected in the case. Brief for Petitioner, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (S. Ct. filed Jul. 16, 2009) at 3 
55 Segura, supra note 44; Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 5. 
Vol. 9:1] TERA AGYEPONG 
   
89
home.56 Later that day, someone returned to the home, and raped an elderly woman.57 
When questioned by the police, Gulley and McCants blamed Sullivan for the rape.  
¶15 Prosecutors relied on the testimonies of Sullivan’s older co-defendants at trial 
to convict him, even though one of them could have been the true assailant.58 As a result 
of their testimonies, the older co-defendants were tried as juveniles and sentenced to short 
terms in a juvenile detention center.59 Sullivan, on the other hand, continues to serve his 
sentence in adult prison and is now confined to a wheel chair because of multiple 
sclerosis.60 Sullivan is one of only two people to be sentenced to life without parole at the 
age of thirteen.61  
¶16 Sullivan tried to appeal his conviction. Despite the existence of numerous 
meritorious grounds for appeal, his appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asking to be 
withdrawn from the case.62 The intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction 
without opinion in 1991, and Florida’s Supreme Court affirmed the decision without 
review that same year.63 In 1992, Sullivan filed an unsuccessful petition for post-
conviction relief.64  
¶17 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, Sullivan filed a 
motion for post-conviction relief contending that Roper rendered his sentence of life 
without parole unconstitutional.65 In 2007, the trial court dismissed his motion with 
prejudice after citing Florida Supreme Court cases that refused to extend Roper to life 
without parole cases.66 Since the lower courts held that Roper was limited to capital 
cases, and sentencing a child to life without parole was not a constitutional violation, it 
concluded Sullivan’s motion was untimely and dismissed it on procedural grounds.67 The 
First District Court of Appeal summarily affirmed without opinion while denying 
rehearing en banc and certification to the Florida Supreme Court.68 Sullivan filed a 
                                                 
56 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 5. 
57 Bach, supra note 50. 
58 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 5; Gulley had an extensive criminal history that included one 
sexual offense. Bach, supra note 50.  
59 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 5; Bach, supra note 50. 
60 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing 13- and 14-Year Old Children to Die in 
Prison 29 (2007) [hereinafter EJI Report]; Krista Gesaman, 18 And a Life To Go, Newsweek Web 
Exclusive, Nov. 4, 2009. 
61 Id. at 24. 
62 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 2. An attorney files an Anders brief, named after Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), when he wishes to withdraw from a case because he believes the appeal is 
frivolous. 
63 Id. at 6. 
64 David L. Hudson, Can Juveniles Be Sentenced to Life in Prison Without the Possibility of Parole? 
(American Bar Association, 2009). 
65 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 6; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b) provides:  
A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other 
motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and 
sentence become final in a non-capital case or more than 1 year after the judgment and sentence become 
final in a capital case. 
66 In 2007, Sullivan filed another motion for DNA testing. The motion was denied after finding that the 
State of Florida had destroyed all biological evidence collected in the case. Id. at 5.  
67 Id. at 1, 7. 
68 Id. at 7. 
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petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court in December 2008, and the Court 
agreed to hear the case in May 2009.69  
2. Argument on Appeal: Does Sentencing Thirteen- and Fourteen-Year-Old Children to 
Life without Parole Violate the Eighth Amendment Bar on Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment? 
i) Petitioner’s Argument 
¶18 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in the Sullivan case was whether the 
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a thirteen-year-old for a non-homicide 
offense violates Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.70 
The petitioner contended that life without parole sentences for thirteen- and fourteen-
year-olds convicted of homicide and non-homicide offenses were unconstitutional.71 He 
also argued that Roper was controlling and required an invalidation of life without parole 
sentences imposed on thirteen-year-olds because the practice was cruel and extremely 
rare.72 In Roper, the Supreme Court held that children are less culpable than adults 
because 1) there are neurological and psychological differences between the brains of 
adolescents and adults, 2) adolescents are more vulnerable to peer pressure and outside 
influences than adults, and 3) adolescents lack the maturity of adults.73 The Roper Court 
also concluded that juvenile death sentences contradicted both national and international 
standards of decency.74 The petitioner contended that since life without parole sentences 
impose a “terminal, unchangeable, and once-and-for-all judgment” that a person is 
“forever unfit to be a part of civil society,” the sentence is unlike lesser sentences which 
allow the possibility of release, but akin to a death sentence, which removes the 
possibility that a person will ever rejoin society.75  
¶19 Sullivan also argued that the imposition of life without parole sentences on 
young teenagers is an “aberrant, vanishingly rare” occurrence by citing statistics.76 
Although statutes in twenty-seven states allowed thirteen-year-olds to be sentenced to life 
without parole and an additional thirteen states allowed fourteen-year-olds to receive the 
sentence, only 9 thirteen-year-olds and 64 fourteen-year-olds were serving such a 
sentence.77 These numbers represented an accumulation of life without parole sentences 
imposed on thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds since the 1970s.78 Since no less than a 
quarter million children under the age of fifteen had been arrested for crimes for which 
                                                 
69 Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009). 
70 Brief for the Petitioner at i, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (U.S. July 16, 2009)  [hereinafter Brief for 
the Petitioner, Sullivan]. A jurisdictional issue was raised concerning the rarity of LWOP sentences for 
thirteen-year old non-homicide offenders and the unavailability of review in other federal courts despite the 
new Eighth Amendment standard promulgated in Roper v. Simmons. Because the Supreme Court did not 
deny cert and agreed to hear the petitioner’s claim surrounding the Eighth Amendment issue, the 
jurisdictional issue will not be addressed here. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 5. 
73 Roper, 543 U.S. at 553, 589-600. 
74 Id. at 551, 561, 575-78. 
75 Brief for the Petitioner, Sullivan, supra note 70, at 5. 
76 Id. at 49. 
77 Id. at 50. 
78 Id. at 51. 
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the LWOP could have been imposed during that time period, Sullivan contended that the 
low number of children under the age of fifteen who had received the sentence was 
“indicative of [a] nationwide repudiation” of the practice.79 
¶20 Based on his “akin to death” and “cruel and unusual” arguments, the 
petitioner contended that life without parole sentences for thirteen- and fourteen-year-
olds was inconsistent with Roper. In Roper the Supreme Court held that persons under 
the age of eighteen are constitutively different and less culpable than adults.80 Sullivan 
concluded that the condemnation of a young teenager to life in prison without parole 
went against evolving standards of decency and is disproportionate to the moral 
culpability of the offender.81 Sullivan’s counsel conceded that it was conceivable, 
although not desirable, that a focus on thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds could lead the 
Court to adopt an approach that was unfavorable to the petitioner in Graham, since that 
petitioner was seventeen years of age when sentenced.82 
ii) Respondent’s Argument 
¶21 The state of Florida did not directly address Sullivan’s arguments; instead it 
urged the Court to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds. It argued that the state court 
did not directly address the Eighth Amendment issue because the state court denied 
Sullivan’s motion on state procedural grounds and not constitutional grounds.83 The 
Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the case on the grounds that it was procedurally 
banned from reaching a decision. However, the Supreme Court did address some of 
Sullivan’s arguments in its decision in Graham v. Florida. Sullivan could benefit from 
the Court’s decision in Graham since he is a member of the class of youth defined by the 
holding. 
B. Graham v. Florida 
1. Factual Background and Procedural History 
¶22 Terrence Graham was one month shy of his eighteenth birthday when he was 
sentenced to life without parole because a judge held he violated the terms of his 
probation.84 Graham, an African American male, was born to parents who were addicted 
to crack cocaine and likely suffered from a form of cocaine addiction at birth. In 
elementary school, Graham was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder.85 Although his mother stopped smoking crack by the time he was eleven, his 
father continued to use the drug throughout his teenage years.86 Graham wanted to move 
                                                 
79 Id. at 50-51. 
80 Id. at 5-8, 61. 
81 Id. at 5-8. 
82 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (S. Ct. 2010) [Hereinafter Sullivan 
Transcript]. 
83 Sullivan, Petition for Cert, supra note 48, at 6-7. 
84 Brief of Respondent at 15, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (S. Ct.  July 16, 2009) [hereinafter Graham 
Merit Brief]; Gesaman, supra note 60.  
85 Brief of Petitioner at 11, Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (S. Ct. 2010). 
86 Id. 
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out of his home so that he would not have to be around his family.87 Graham also 
suffered from depression by his late teens because of his turbulent home life.88 
¶23 At the age of sixteen, Graham was convicted of armed robbery, spent a year 
in a pre-trial detention center, and was then place on probation for three years.89 In 2004, 
seventeen-year-old Graham and two twenty-year-old co-defendants were arrested on 
suspicion of home invasion.90 Graham, who was ultimately sentenced to LWOP for 
violating his probation, never admitted to the home invasion, a charge he insisted police 
were “trying to pin against” him.91  
¶24 The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) recommended that Graham 
receive either a forty-eight month prison sentence or a twenty-four months prison 
sentence followed by twenty-four months of probation. The Florida DOC based its 
recommendation on its finding that Graham had “the usual teenage problems” and up 
until the home invasion had been compliant with the terms of his probation.92 The court 
rejected the Florida DOC’s recommendations and concluded that Graham was incapable 
of rehabilitation and could not be deterred from committing future crimes.93 Instead of 
giving Graham the recommended one or two years prison sentence, the judge sentenced 
him to life without the parole.94 His two older co-defendants, on the other hand, were 
sentenced to eleven and thirty-five years in prison, respectively.95 Graham filed a post-
sentencing motion with the trial court, challenging the legality of the sentence on Eighth 
Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court of Florida denied discretionary review of the 
case and he was granted a writ of certiorari in May 2009.96 
2. Arguments on Appeal: Sentencing Juveniles to Life without Parole for Non-Homicide 
Offenses and the Eighth Amendment 
i) Petitioner’s Argument 
¶25 The question before the Court in Graham was whether the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imposition of a life 
without parole sentence for a juvenile who has been convicted of a non-homicide 
offense.97 Like Sullivan, Graham argued that a life without parole sentence was akin to 
the death penalty because it rejects rehabilitation and is irrevocable.98 Unlike the 
petitioner in Sullivan, Graham’s arguments focused on the fact that the offense in 
question was a non-homicide.99 Graham relied on the Eighth Amendment and 
underscored the Court’s conclusion in Roper that persons under the age of eighteen are 
                                                 
87 Id. at 12. 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 Hudson, supra note 64. 
90 Graham Merit Brief, at 6-7; Hudson, supra note 64, at 76. 
91 Brief of Petitioner, Graham, supra note 85, at 19. 
92 Id. at 20. 
93 Id. at 21. 
94 Id.; Hudson, supra note 64, at 77. 
95 Brief of Petitioner, Graham, supra note 85, at 23. 
96 Id. at 24. 
97 Id. at i; Graham Merit Brief, at 1. 
98 Brief of Petitioner, Graham, supra note 85, at 24-25. 
99 Id. at 24. 
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constitutively different and less culpable than adults.100 Moreover, Graham rejected the 
“death is different” argument and pointed to the Court’s precedent of examining an 
offender’s characteristics for both capital and non-capital offenses.101   
¶26 Graham argued that the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Roper that children 
have diminished culpability and an infinite capacity to change required that it conclude 
that sentencing persons under the age of eighteen who had been convicted of non-
homicide offenses to life without parole is unconstitutional.102 The petitioner also 
asserted that sentencing children who are convicted of non-homicide offenses to life 
without parole was “cruel” when compared to the gravity of the offense and violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on grossly disproportionate punishment.103  
¶27 Graham concluded that the imposition of the sentence was also “unusual 
because most jurisdictions rarely, if ever, impose such a sentence.”104 Statistics from 
Florida’s DOC showed that Graham’s sentence was 8.5 times greater than the average 
sentence for all adult violent offenders, 7.1 times greater than the average sentence for all 
adult offenders convicted of armed burglary, and 2.2 times greater than the average 
sentence for all adult offenders convicted of murder.105 Moreover, Graham was one of 
only seventy-seven juvenile, non-homicide offenders in Florida serving life without 
parole.106 Nationally, five thousand juvenile offenders in the adult criminal system have 
committed crimes comparable to or more serious than Graham.107 
¶28 The petitioner also highlighted the Court’s “well settled precedent” of 
considering a variety of factors when assessing proportionality.108 Such factors include 
the sentence’s underlying penological purposes, the harshness of the sentence compared 
to the offense, the defendant’s characteristics, legislative judgments, and a comparison of 
sentencing laws and practices among the states and the international community.109 
Graham argued that based on the combination of all these factors, his sentence was cruel 
and unusual.110 
ii) Respondent’s Argument 
¶29 According to the state of Florida, the punishment was not “cruel and unusual” 
because the Eighth Amendment contained no textual or jurisprudential basis for a 
categorical ban on life without parole sentences for juveniles.111 The state pointed to non-
capital cases like Harmelin v. Michigan, where the Supreme Court held life without 
parole sentences are constitutional “for the mere possession of six hundred and seventy-
                                                 
100 Id. at 24-28. 
101 The “death is different” argument emphasizes the uniqueness of capital punishment by underscoring 
that death is different from any kind of punishment because of its finality and termination of life. Id. at 25. 
102 Id. at 24. 
103 Id. at 25-26, 54. 
104 Id. at 54. 
105 Id. at 58. 
106 Id. at 59. 
107 Id. at 60. 
108 Id. at 25; See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-321 (2002). 
109 Brief of Petitioner, Graham, supra note 85, at 25-28; See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) 
(plurality opinion) (establishing that in a non-death penalty case, that the Eighth Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). 
110 Brief of Petitioner, Graham, supra note 85 at 50-66. 
111 Graham Merit Brief, supra note 84, at 18. 
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two grams of cocaine,” and Rummel v. Estelle, where the Court held a life sentence for 
the commission of three non-violent offenses was constitutional.112 Florida also argued 
that the state made a conscious decision to try him in adult court based on the serious 
nature of Graham’s crime. Moreover, Florida argued that if the Court concluded 
Graham’s sentence was disproportionate because of his age, the Court would undermine 
states’ efforts to penalize children who “engage in adult like crimes” by transferring them 
to adult systems.113 
¶30 Florida rejected petitioner’s Roper analysis and argued that the Court’s 
prohibition of capital punishment for minors did not make harsh penalties like life 
without parole categorically unconstitutional.114 It argued that society already uses age as 
mitigating factor by having a separate system of justice for juveniles.115  
3. The Supreme Court’s Resolution of the Issue 
¶31 In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court’s held in Graham that life without 
parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses are unconstitutional.116 
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that the decision, which relied on 
Roper, “gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and 
reform.”  The Court concluded that children “should not be deprived of the opportunity to 
achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and 
potential….[Florida] has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to 
rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed when he was a 
child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.”117 Neither 
Graham nor Sullivan argued that LWOP should be categorically banned for all children 
under seventeen; rather, their arguments focused on children under the age of seventeen 
who had been found guilty of a non-homicide offense. For this reason, it was unlikely 
that the Court would broaden its ruling by prohibiting LWOP for all children, including 
those who were convicted of homicide. 
¶32 It is clear from the oral argument transcripts that most of the Justices were 
inclined to adjust the scheme for giving children life without parole sentences in some 
way.118  Justices Roberts and Alito seemed to be in favor of a proportionality review 
where each child would be sentenced depending upon the type of crime they committed 
and other circumstances surrounding their offense. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Kennedy, 
and Sotomayor, on the other hand, seemed to favor a categorical ban based on age or the 
type of offense committed.119 Justice Scalia and Thomas, however, did not make 
statements indicating they would favor any changes to the practice of imposing LWOP 
on juveniles. Although the Court decided to institute a categorical ban for non-homicide 
                                                 
112 Id. at 18; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 1008, 1008-09 (1991); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283-
85 (1980). 
113 Graham Merit Brief, supra note 84 at 18-19. 
114 Id. at 19-20. 
115 Id. at 20. 
116 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). Sullivan was dismissed based on a procedural issue. 
117 Id. at 2032- 33. 
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 17,28-30, 33-34, 41, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412) 
[Hereinafter Graham Transcript]; Sullivan Transcript, supra note 82 at 16. 
119 Transcript of Oral Argument passim, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); 
Transcript of Oral Argument passim, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621). 
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offenses, the proportionality review approach would have been in line with Roper v. 
Simmons. In Roper, the Court held that children’s neurological differences from adults, 
lack of maturity, and vulnerability to peer pressure made them categorically different and 
less culpable than adults; therefore, the death penalty for juveniles was 
disproportionate.120  
¶33 When the Court followed Graham’s logic—drawing a line at eighteen—it 
held that LWOP for children seventeen and under who are convicted of non-homicide 
offenses is unconstitutional, its decision was based on the Eighth Amendment. As it did 
in Roper, the Court also used international law as persuasive authority.121 In Graham, the 
Court found “support for [its] conclusion in the fact that, in continuing to impose life 
without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit homicide, the United States 
adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the world over.”122 Although the Court noted 
“the global consensus against the practice in question,” it also concluded “the judgments 
of other nations and the international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment.”123 
¶34 The Graham Court should have considered international standards when it 
made its decision because juvenile LWOP sentences violate several treaties to which the 
United States is either a signatory or state party.124 LWOP sentences are prohibited under 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The treaty bodies 
charged with enforcing these treaties have found the United States out of compliance 
because it sentenced children to LWOP. If the Court had incorporated international 
standards into its decision in Graham by referencing the customary international law and 
the above mentioned conventions, its decision would be in compliance with international 
human rights standards. As it stands now, the United States continues to fail to meet these 
standards in the ICCPR and CERD because it continues to sentence children who 
committed homicides to LWOP. International law categorically bans LWOP sentences 
for children without exception. The Court’s decision to abolish the sentence only for 
children who committed non-homicide offenses falls short; the United States continues to 
act in violation of international law. 
IV. SENTENCING CHILDREN CONVICTED OF NON-HOMICIDE OR HOMICIDE OFFENSES 
TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
 
                                                 
120 Roper, 543 U.S. at 589. 
121 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Roper, 543 U.S. at 562-63; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, 848-50 (1988). See De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 14 for a similar discussion. 
122 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033. 
123 Id. 
124 The United States is a state party to the ICCPR, CERD, and Convention against Torture. Brief for 
Amnesty International at 25, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 and 
Sullivan v. Florida 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (No. 08-7621) (S. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Amnesty 
Brief]. 
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¶35 The international community, as well as international human rights law, 
condemns the practice of sentencing children to life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.125 This condemnation is not qualified by the age of the child or the offense 
committed. Rather, this condemnation is categorical, as the international community 
views juvenile life without parole sentences as an abrogation of modern society’s shared 
responsibility for child protection and rehabilitation.126 Domestic laws should be 
amended so that they are in compliance with international human rights standards. 
A. Jus Cogens and The Convention of the Rights of the Child  
¶36 The Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) codifies an international 
customary norm that forbids sentencing children to spend life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.127 Even though the United States is the sole country that has refused 
to ratify to the CRC, its provisions can still bind the United States. Juvenile LWOP 
sentences have been rejected and condemned by every nation in the world except the 
Untied States.128 Most governments never allowed, expressly prohibit, or do not impose 
life without parole sentences because they violate principles of child protection and 
development.129  
¶37 A norm is considered customary international law when it is widespread, 
constant, and practiced uniformly by nations because of a legal obligation.130 It relies, 
however, on the consent of different nations. The condemnation of sentencing children to 
life without parole is so universal that it has reached the level of a jus cogens norm.131 Jus 
Cogens norms have a higher status than customary international laws, and all nations are 
expected to comply with them.132 A norm attains jus cogens status when it meets three 
requirements: (1) it is general or customary international law; (2) it has not been modified 
by a new norm of the same status; and (3) a large majority of countries accept it as non-
derogable.133  
¶38 The international prohibition against life without parole sentences for 
children fulfills these requirements and has thus reached the status of a jus cogens norm. 
First, as explained above, there is a widespread and consistent practice of refusing to 
sentence children to life without parole because it is seen as a violation of agreements to 
protect the life of the child.134 Historically, very few countries have sentenced children to 
life without parole, and the United States rarely used this sentence before the 1990s.135 
Second, the norm continues to have universal acceptance and has recently been 
                                                 
125 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 3.  
126 Id.; Andrea Templeton, Lost Potential: International Treaty Obligations and Juvenile Life Without 
Parole in Edmonds v. State of Mississippi, 26 Law & Ineq. 233, 241-43 (2008). 
127 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1009. 
128 Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 9.  
129 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 989-90. 
130 Id. at 1014; Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 11; Molly C. Quinn, Life Without Parole for Juvenile 
Offenders: A Violation of Customary International Law, 52 St. Luis L.J. 283, 285-87 (2007). 
131 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1013-14; Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 13. 
132 Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 9.  
133 Id., at 13; De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1014-17. 
134 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1015.  
135 Id. at 989-91, 1015. 
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reconfirmed by individual countries and international treaty bodies.136 For example, the 
General Assembly adopted by vote a resolution for the immediate abolition of juvenile 
life without parole sentences by law in its 2006, 2007, and 2008 meetings. Of the one 
hundred and eighty-five nations that attended each meeting, the United States was always 
the only nation to dissent.137 Third, there is near universal acceptance that the prohibition 
against life without parole sentences is legally binding, as codified by the Convention of 
the Rights of the Child. With the exception of the United States, all nations have ratified 
the CRC.138 If the CRC is accepted as jus cogens, the United States’ failure to ratify it 
does not relieve it of its responsibility to protect all children from LWOP, as the 
Convention mandates.139  
¶39 Article 3(1) provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law...or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.” The Article did 
not mandate that the best interests of the child be of primary consideration depending on 
their age or whether they have been convicted of a non-homicide. The mandate is 
categorical and without exception: the best interests of the children can never include 
sentencing children to LWOP, even if they have been convicted of a homicide.  
¶40 Article 37(a) expressly prohibits sentencing children to life without parole: 
“Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be 
imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.”140 The 
Committee on the Rights the Rights of the Child, the body responsible for monitoring 
compliance with the CRC, clarified this prohibition in its 2007 General Comment when it 
recommended that “parties abolish all forms of life imprisonment for offences committed 
by persons under the age of eighteen.”141 The United States’ practice of sentencing any 
child to life without parole represents a contravention of this principle. 
¶41 Life without parole sentences for children also violate Article 37(b) of the 
CRC, which states that the “arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child ...shall be used 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.” Not only 
do life without parole sentences abrogate the provision that calls for the use of prisons as 
a last resort, the sentences fall far short of the call to incarcerate children for “the shortest 
period of time.” As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Roper, it is almost impossible for a 
judge or jury to correctly determine whether a child can be rehabilitated, because their 
“characters” have not yet been formed.142 Even if it were possible to determine whether a 
child could be rehabilitated, judges or laypersons on juries, as opposed to doctors and 
psychiatrists, are not equipped to make such determinations. Any determination that a 
particular child is so incorrigible that they are fit not only for imprisonment, but 
                                                 
136 Id. at 1015; Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 18-21; Res. 10/2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.11, ¶ 11 
(adopted Mar. 25, 2009); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, 
General Comment No. 10, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (2007). 
137 Amnesty Brief, supra note 124, at 20. 
138 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1009; Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 99. 
139 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1015.  
140 CRC, supra note 4, Art.37(a). This note uses the definition of “child” found in the Convention of the 
Rights of the Child, Article 1: “A child means every human being below the age of eighteen years.” U.N. 
Convention on Rights of the Child, Art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/44/736, 28 I.L.M. 1456 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
141 De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1009. 
142 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 598-99. 
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imprisonment for life without any hope of release, violates international standards of 
decency, as codified by this article. 
¶42 Article 37(c) of the CRC mandates that every child “deprived of liberty shall 
be treated with humanity...In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated 
from adults.” The Convention specifically prohibited incarcerating children alongside 
adults because they recognized the special challenges children who are house with adults 
face. Most children who are sentenced to life without parole are imprisoned among 
adults, and are thus five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely to be 
beaten by staff, and 50% more likely to be attacked by a weapon than minors who are 
housed in juvenile facilities.143 Article 19(1) of the CRC mandates that state parties take 
“all appropriate...measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence...neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual 
abuse.” Subjecting children to an environment where their chances of being physically 
and sexually assaulted are dramatically increased also falls short of “ensuring the survival 
and development of the child,” as mandated in Article 6(2). 
¶43 The CRC also specifically requires that countries ensure the rights of the 
child “without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s 
or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language...national, ethnic, or social origin” in 
Article 2(1). The discriminatory application of life without parole sentences puts the 
United States in violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, a treaty that it has both signed and ratified. As will be explained in the 
subsequent section, children of color in the United States have been disproportionately 
subjected to LWOP sentences and this will probably continue to occur despite the Court’s 
limitation of the sentence to homicide offense.  
B. Discriminatory Impact & CERD as a Basis for Abolition of Juvenile LWOP 
¶44 All of the children who have been sentenced to life without parole for non-
homicide offenses are children of color.144 Seventy one percent of the children serving 
life without parole sentences are children of color, even though they make up only 26% 
of the population.145 Overall, African American children, who make up 60% of all 
children sentenced to life without parole, are sentenced to LWOP at a rate that is ten 
times higher than that of white youth.146 In every single state that sentences juveniles to 
life without parole, African American children are sentenced at a rate that exceeds that of 
white youth.147 In California, the rate is eighteen times that of white youth.148 
¶45 Unless one believes that African American children are more incorrigible and 
prone to violent behavior than white children, the extremely disproportionate rate at 
which they are sentenced to life without parole should signal the existence of widespread 
discrimination against them. A 2009 Special Report on Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
                                                 
143 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 73. 
144 EJI Report, supra note 60, at 21, 24. 
145 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 39; Census Bureau, supra note 10. 
146 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 39. 
147 Id. at 42. 
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and Xenophobia by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism found 
that racial disparities in life without parole sentences remained even after controlling for 
differences in arrest rates.149 The discriminatory administration of life without parole 
sentences is not an aberration, as children of color generally receive harsher treatment 
than white youth for the same offenses, and widespread discrimination has been 
documented at every stage of the juvenile justice system.150 The racially disparate nature 
of the application of life without parole sentences is a clear violation of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to which the United 
States is a party.151 States Parties to CERD agree to “promote and encourage . . . . 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”152  
¶46 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the official 
monitoring body for CERD, concluded in 2006 and 2008 that juvenile life without parole 
sentences are incompatible with the United States’ obligations under the treaty.153 The 
disparate sentencing rates conflict with Article 5(a) of CERD, which asks State parties to 
guarantee to persons their “right to equal treatment before the tribunals.” The Committee 
noted with concern the disproportionate number of racial and ethnic minorities who 
received life without parole sentences. “In light of the disproportionate imposition of life 
imprisonment without parole on young offenders including children belonging to racial, 
ethnic and national minorities” the Committee recommended that the United States 
discontinue the use of life sentence without parole against persons under the age of 
eighteen at the time the offence was committed and “review the situation of persons 
already serving such sentences.”154  
¶47 The persistence of racial disparities in the sentencing of children also violates 
Articles 2 and 6 of CERD. Article 2(1)(c) specifically provides that each State Party shall 
“take effective measures...to amend, rescind, or nullify any laws and regulations which 
have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.” Article 6 similarly 
provides that “States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies...against any acts of racial discrimination.” Juvenile life without 
parole sentences clearly have the effect of perpetuating racial discrimination. The 
Supreme Court’s failure to prohibit the sentencing of any child to life without parole puts 
the United States in breach of CERD. Although the abolition of LWOP sentences for 
children through CERD because of their discriminatory impact would occur solely 
through a focus on children of color, children of all races would benefit from its complete 
abolition. 
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C. Cruel Confinement as a Violation of the ICCPR 
¶48 The United States is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Under several provisions of this Covenant, life without parole 
sentences are cruel when applied to children. As a result, the US is in violation of the 
ICCPR.155 Article 7, like the Eighth Amendment, prohibits “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”156  
¶49 Article 14(4) mandates that “in the case of juvenile persons...procedure[s] 
shall...take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.” 
Article 14 is reinforced by Article 24(1), which states every child shall have “the right to 
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor on the part of his 
family, society, and the state.”157 The mechanisms through which a significant number of 
children are sentenced to life without parole do not “take account of their age” as 
“required by [their] status as a minor.” A significant number of children sentenced to life 
without parole are sentenced according to mandatory sentencing schemes or sentenced to 
felony murder without individualized review by a judge.158 Sentencing a child to die in 
prison without even attempting to determine whether they are truly unable to be 
rehabilitated flies in the face of Articles 14(4) and 24(1).  
¶50 The incarceration of children who receive LWOP sentences alongside adults 
also violates Article 10(3) of the ICCPR, which specifically mandates that “[j]uvenile 
offenders shall be segregated from adults.” Article 10(3) also provides that the “essential 
aim” of the penitentiary system “shall comprise treatment of prisoners, the essential aim 
of which shall be their reformation and rehabilitation.”159 Since many children sentenced 
to life without parole are denied access to the rehabilitative, educational, and vocational 
training available in prisons because they are never expected to return to society,160 this 
practice clearly violates Article 10(3). The very judgment that children are irredeemable, 
as symbolized by sentencing them to life without parole, contradicts any purported 
rehabilitative goal. 
¶51 The United States ratified the ICCPR with reservations to Articles 10(3) and 
14(4). It reserved the right to treat juveniles as adults in “exceptional circumstances.”  
However, the large number of children serving LWOP sentences as a result of automatic 
sentencing schemes underscores the reality that the United States has not reserved the 
right to treat juveniles as adults only in exceptional cases. By definition, mandatory 
sentences preclude individual assessments of a child’s fitness for rehabilitation. During a 
2006 meeting, the ICCPR Committee stated with regard to the United States that it was 
“concerned by the information that the treatment of children as adults is not only applied 
in exceptional circumstances.”161 Moreover, the Committee concluded that sentencing 
                                                 
155 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1009. 
156 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XX1), 21. U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976. 
157 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1010. 
158 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 27, 90-93. 
159 Id. at 73. 
160 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 1009. 
161 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties UnderArticle 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 
United States of America, 87th Sess. July 10-28, 2006 (CCPR/C/USA/CO/3) (Sept. 15, 2006), para. 34. 
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children to life without parole is not in compliance with Article 24(1) of the Covenant 
and mandated that the United States “ensure that no such child offender is sentenced to 
life imprisonment without parole, and should...review the situation of persons already 
serving such sentences.”162  
D. Cruel Treatment and Punishment as a violation of the Convention against 
Torture 
¶52 The United States’ practice of sentencing children to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole also violates the UN Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against 
Torture). Each State Party to the Convention is expected to prevent “acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”163 In 2006, the Committee Against 
Torture, the international body that oversees compliance with the Convention, expressed 
concern over the large number of children sentenced to life imprisonment in the United 
States. In the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations against torture given the 
United States, it concluded that the US should address the question of LWOP for children 
as it “could constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” in violation 
of the treaty.164 The neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and psychological trauma 
children who are sentenced to LWOP experience165 meet the minimum standard for any 
definition of torture. For these reasons, the practice of increasing the chances that 
children will be subjected to known traumas by giving them LWOP sentences constitutes 
a violation of the Convention Against Torture. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶53 Juvenile life without parole sentences violate the CRC, CERD, ICCPR, and 
Convention Against Torture. The United States’ simultaneous violation of these treaties 
in light of jus cogens norms and the Eighth Amendment makes the practice especially 
troubling. Even more troubling is the lack of evidence that LWOP has any deterrent 
effect on youth.166 If the Supreme Court had weighed the practice of sentencing children 
to LWOP against customary international law and international treaties, such as the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), it would have had a 
stronger impetus to categorically ban juvenile LWOP in Graham. Juvenile LWOP is not 
only a misguided violation of the standards of decency in the Eighth Amendment but is a 
violation of international human rights law as well.  
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, A/RES/39/46, entered into force, June 26, 1987, ratified by the United States, Oct. 21, 1994. 
164 Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture: United States of America, at para. 35, U.N. Doc. CAT/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006). 
165 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 73; Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: 
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989) 
166 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 3.  
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¶54 When society sentences children to life without parole, it implicitly tells them 
that they are irredeemable and incapable of positive change.167 Children in the United 
States—the only group of children who will continue to receive this harsh sentence—
cannot be more violent, incorrigible, and less deserving of humane treatment than 
children in other parts of the world.168 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to rectify 
this injustice by ending juvenile LWOP when it rendered its decisions in Graham and 
Sullivan. Although the Court’s decision in Graham was a victory to a number of children 
who had committed non-homicide offenses, it fell short of a categorical ban. The 
Supreme Court’s failure to incorporate international human rights treaties into its analysis 
means that thousands of children will continue to spend their lives behind bars. 
 
                                                 
167 Amnesty & HRW, supra note 6, at 82. 
168 De la Vega & Leighton, supra note 1, at 990.  
